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Abstract: In this paper the effects of Irish exchange rate policy on competitiveness is considered. The paper 
looks at the entire period since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods fixed exchange rate regime in 1970. It 
argues that the impact oflosses in competitiveness on Irish industry may have been overstated and that other 
factors may have played a significant part in the decline of traditional manufacturing industry since 1980. 
This has considerable implications for exchange rate policy. 
1. Introduction 
Employment in manufacturing industry in 1987 was 35,000 below its 1980 
peak-according to the results of the Labour Force Surveys (CSO). It has been 
suggested by some authors that this is the result of a steady decline in 
competitiveness since the establishment of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979. (See for example Bacon (1986) and Walsh (1988) on this point). 
This loss in competitiveness is attributed to increases in labour costs relative 
to other EMS member states which have not been offset by movements in the 
exchange rate of the Irish pound. A devaluation has been suggested as a 
possible means of improving competitivess and boosting output and 
employment in industry. The present paper questions such arguments. It 
argues that the decline in manufacturing employment reflects a number of 
factors besides changes in labour cost competitiveness and that a devaluation 
would not, therefore, be as effective as is sometimes suggested. 
The paper is concerned only with the impact of relative labour costs and the 
exchange rate on competitiveness. This ignores a variety of other factors which 
affect industry's overall competitive position. However, labour costs and the 
exchange rate are the two aspects of competitiveness that have received most 
attention in previous Irish studies. The current paper argues that studies which 
have concentrated purely on the period since EMS entry may have overstated 
the extent of losses in competitiveness. This is because the Irish pound entered 
the EMS at a rate "that was relatively favourable from the viewpoint of 
competitiveness" (Van Ypersele (1985) p. 89). 
The paper also argues that the decline in manufacturing employment may 
have been due to a variety of factors other than competitiveness. External 
shocks due to higher energy prices, technical change and increased competition 
from Newly Industralising Countries (NICs) required some form of structural 
adjustment within smaller European economies such as Ireland. In Ireland's 
case this was compounded by increased competition arising from EC entry in 
1973. It is argued that the fall in employment resulting from these shocks may 
have been mistakenly attributed to losses in competitiveness. 
I am grateful to Professor Brendan Walsh, UCD, Dr. Tony Leddin, NIHE Limerick and Mr. Joe Durkan, 
Coopers and Lyrand for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Responsibility for the final 
,ontent is mine alone. 
45 
There is reason to believe that the restrictive fiscal stance of the Irish 
authorities during the 1980s also played a part in the decline in manufacturing 
employment both through its impact on domestic demand and on the supply 
side of the economy. The sharp increase in taxation during this period appears 
likely to have been a factor in any loss in competitiveness that did occur. For 
these reasons it is argued that calls for a devaluation are mistaken. 
The balance of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 the issue of 
competitiveness is considered briefly from a theoretical standpoint. This is 
followed by an examination of the empirical evidence in Section 3. Section 4 
then considers the impact of exchange rate policy on the economy and on the 
manufacturing sector in particular. Other factors which affected manufactur-
ing employment are also considered at this stage. The implications of this 
analysis for exchange rate policy are considered in Section 5. The mam 
findings are then summarised in the concluding Section of the paper. 
2. The Nature of Competitiveness 
Most manufacturing firms along with many operating in the services sector 
must compete with overseas suppliers on both home and export markets. An 
increase in domestic production costs relative to those abroad tends to damage 
employment prospects in Ireland. If firms are price takers then increased costs 
will reduce profit margins and may force Irish firms out of particular markets. 
Where firms can pass on cost increases in higher prices they are likely to lose 
market share to foreign competitors. In either case output and employment are 
reduced and in the longer term the firm's ability to invest in new plant and 
equipment is seriously eroded. (A more detailed discussion may be found in 
the Report of the Committee on Costs and Competitiveness (1981)). 
Bacon and Walsh (op. cit.) have both pointed to a significant loss in labour 
cost competitivenss relative to other EMS countries since the establishment of 
the system. They have identified this as a major factor in the contraction of 
employment in Irish manufacturing industry. This loss in competitiveness is 
attributed to a failure to adjust the exchange rate within the EMS to 
compensate for increases in relative labour costs. 
In looking at competitiveness we are concerned with movements in real 
exchange rate relative to our main trading partners, i.e., the nominal exchange 
rate 'adjusted for differences in labour cost inflation. The real exchange rate Rx, 
is therefore defined as: 
e.(Pd/Pf) (1) 
where Pd and Pf are domestic and foreign price indices and e is the nominal 
exchange rate expressed in units of foreign currency per Irish pound. An 
appreciation of the real exchange rate implies a loss of competitiveness. 
Admittedly competitiveness depends on a variety of factors besides labour 
costs. These include the cost of inputs such as electricity along with factors such 
as marketing and product quality. However, labour costs have been identified 
as "the most useful available indicator for international comparisons", Report 
of the Committee on Costs and Competitiveness ( op. cit.) p. 13. 
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3. Empirical Evidence 
In the immediate aftermath of the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods fixed 
exchange rate regime in the early 1970s the Irish authorities opted to maintain 
the long standing fixed exchange link with sterling. For most of the 1970s 
sterling was a relatively weak currency so that maintenance of the sterling link 
involved a significant depreciation in the exchange rate relative to most 
European currencies. This policy was reversed following the establishment of 
the EMS in 1979. The Irish decision to join the EMS in spite of the UK 
decision not to participate represented a major shift in Irish exchange rate 
policy. Joining the EMS involved considerable risk, as at the time of entry, 
member countries accounted for less than 30 per cent of Ireland's external 
trade. As pointed out in a previous paper (Massey (1987)) the dangers inherent 
in such a strategy appear to have been recognised at the time. 
Since the establishment of the EMS the Irish pound has been one of the 
stronger currencies within the system. Between 1978 and the middle of 1986 the 
Irish pound appreciated against all member currencies except the DM and the 
Dutch Guilder. (See Table 1.) This resulted from the Irish authorities' policy 
of going through the middle at most realignments, i.e., neither revaluing nor 
devaluing. The exception to this was the March 1983 realignment when the 
Irish pound was devalued. This occured in response to a decline in sterling 
which raised fears of a loss in competitiveness relative to our major trading 
partner. Similar fears are believed to have been behind the decision to devalue 
the Irish pound unilaterally by 8 per cent in August 1986 although this was 
officially denied. (See Dowling (1986).) 
TABLE 1: Irish Pound Exchange Rate (End Period) 
DM Dutch French Belgian Danish Italian 
Guilder Franc Franc Krone Lira 
(Units Per Irish Pound) 
December 1978 3. 72 4.02 8.51 58.82 10.38 1689.95 
July 1986 2.99 3.37 9.66 61.63 11.20 2055.24 
December 1987 2.65 2.98 8.98 55.48 10.21 1956.15 
August 1988 2.68 3.02 9.11 56.17 10.29 1988.50 
Sourc:t': Central Bank Bulletins, end August figures taken from Reuters. 
The rate of growth in average hourly manufacturing earnings was used to 
estimate the real exchange 'rate. (This calculation ignores the effects of increases 
in productivity which are considered at a later stage). Figures 1-3 illustrate 
trends in the real exchange rate relative to sterling, the EMS and all Ireland's 
major trading partners. The latter includes the US, Canada, Austria, Sweden 
and Japan in addition to the UK and EMS members. Together these countries 
account for roughly 85 per cent of Ireland's foreign trade. The year 1970 was 
chosen as the start date as if coincided with the breakdown of the "Bretton-
Woods" fixed exchange rate regime. 
The real exchange rate with respect to the EMS bloc and all major trading 
partners is a weighted average, with each country given a weight corresponding 
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to its share in Irish external trade for the year in question. This is not an 
entirely satisfactory approach as it fails to take account of the fact that in export 
markets Irish firms compete with imports from other countries as well as with 
local firms. Nevertheless it provides some insight into trends in competitiveness 
over time. (See O'Leary (1981) for a detailed discussion on constructing indices 
of competitiveness for Irish industry). Data on hourly earnings in 
manufacturing for each of the countries concerned were obtained from 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) while data on nominal exchange rates 
were obtained from Central Bank bulletins. 
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The real exchange rate is broken down into its component parts in order to 
assess to what extent a change in the real exchange rate was due to a nominal 
exchange rate change or to changes in relative wage inflation rates. 
In all cases we find that wage inflation in Ireland exceeded that in our main 
trading partners for most of the period since 1970. During the 1970s the fixed 
exchange rate link with sterling resulted in a sizeable appreciation of the real 
exchange rate relative to that currency. This sustained real appreciation relative 
to our main trading partner appears surprising, but may reflect relative gains 
in productivity. Much of the appreciation in the real exchange rate was reversed 
following the establishment of the EMS due to the strength of sterling over the 
1979-81 period. Since 1981 there has been a renewed appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. This was due to wage inflation in Ireland exceeding that in the 
UK up to 1984 while the nominal exchange rate remained fairly stable. Since 
1984 the Irish pound has appreciated against sterling but this has been partially 
offset by lower wage inflation in Ireland which may in turn reflect the fall in 
manufacturing employment. The real exchange rate in 1987 was still below its 
pre-EMS level suggesting no loss in competitiveness relative to the UK since 
EMS entry, but that short-term gains in competitiveness during the initial years 
of the EMS were quickly reversed. 
In the case of EMS currencies we find that prior to the establishment of the 
system, relative wage increases were more than offset by a decline in the 
nominal exchange rate so that the real exchange rate also declined over this 
period. Since EMS entry the nominal exchange rate relative to member 
currencies has remained relatively stable leading to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. In this case, therefore, the evidence suggests that gains in 
competitiveness during the period prior to EMS entry have been wiped out 
since the establishment of the system. 
The picture for the overall real exchange rate shows most of the increase in 
relative wage costs being offset by declines in the nominal exchange rate so that 
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the real exchange rate increased quite slowly up to 1985. There was a 
significant real appreciation during 1986/7 reflecting the sudden weakening of 
the dollar and of sterling which followed soon after. The results are now 
summarised in Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2: Irish Pound Real Exchange Rate (Average Manufacturing 
Earnings) 
1970-78 
1978-87 
1970-87 
Sterling 
+ 3.2 
-0.4 
+ 1.3 
(Based on period average exchange rates) 
Source: IMF and Central Bank bulletins 
EMS 
Annual 
- 2.1 
+ 2.9 
+ 0.5 
Dollar All Major 
Trading Partners 
% Change 
+ 7.1 
+ 3.2 
+ 5.0 
+ 2.1 
+ 1.3 
+ 1. 7 
Since the end of 1987, sterling has appreciated relative to the EMS group 
of currencies including the Irish pound. At the same time average industrial 
earnings have risen significantly faster in the UK than in Ireland. As a result 
Irish industry experienced a significant improvement in competitiveness 
relative to the UK during the course of 1988. 
The r~~ults in Table 2 take no account of relative productivity changes. One 
way to allow for this would be to estimate the real exchange rate on the basis 
of unit labour cost inflation. Much of the recorded growth in productivity in 
Irish industry since 1980 has been due to a relatively small number of foreign 
firms operating in a limited number of industrial sectors. Consequently the 
data do not provide an accurate indication of trends in traditional sectors. This 
can be overcome by excluding those industrial sectors referred to hereafter as 
the "modern" sectors from the calculations. These sectors are listed in Table 
3 below. 
TABLE 3: Foreign Firms Output Share (1985) 
Office & Data Processing 
Machinery 
Pharmaceuticals 
Instrument Engineering 
Electrical Engineering 
Miscellaneous Foods 
Total Manufacturing 
Source: Census of Industrial Production (1985) 
NACE Code Gross Output 
% 
33 
257 
37 
34 
4ll,414,4i5, 
417,418,423 
99.2 
96.5 
97.0 
89.9 
76.3 
57.4 
Net Output 
% 
99.4 
97.9 
98.0 
91.5 
88.5 
68.2 
A detailed discussion of the rationale for extracting the first 3 of these sectors 
m order to gain a better insight into underlying trends in traditional 
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manufacturing was included in a previous edition of the Quarterly. Economic 
Commentary (ESRI (1985)). It has been decided to add electrical enginering and 
miscellaneous foods to the "modern" group in the light of recent output gains 
in these sectors coupled with the fact that like the other members of the group 
they appear to be dominated by overseas firms. 
The second difficulty arises because of the fact that changes in productivity 
"are in part endogenous responses to changes in hourly earnings" (Report of the 
Committee on Costs and Competitz"veness ( op. cit.) p. 43). Productivity improvements 
inay be due to inefficient firms going out of business and reductions in 
employment in other firms. Nevertheless, whilst bearing these caveats in mind, 
estimates of the real exchange rate based on unit labour cost inflation have been 
calculated as an indicator of trends in competitiveness adjusted for productivity 
gams. 
In the case of Ireland, increases in unit labour costs for the 1980-87 period 
were calculated excluding the "modern" sectors. This provides an index of 
competitiveness which is a more accurate reflection of the experience of firms 
in traditional manufacturing sectors. Unit labour costs were defined as: 
(W.N)/Q (2) 
where W is average earnings plus employers' social insurance contributions 
and N and Qare employment and output. (Data on employment and earnings 
were obtained from the CSO Quarterly Enquiry on Industrial Employment 
while figures on output were obtained from the Industrial Production Index.) 
Unit labour cost figures for Ireland prior to 1980 and for other countries for 
the entire period were obtained from International Financial Statistics and 
relate to all manufacturing sectors. The rapid productivity growth of the 
"modern" sectors in Ireland has been concentrated in the period since 1980 so 
there was little need to separate these sectors out prior to that date. (The 
absence of data for output and employment for some of the "modern" sectors 
prior to 1980 meant that it was not possible to calculate a unit labout costs series 
for earlier years anyway.) The results of these calculations are summarised in 
Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4: Irish Pound Real Exchange Rate (Unit Labour Costs) 
Sterling EMS 
Annual 
1970-78 - 1.4 - 3.4 
1978-87 -0.5 + 0.9 
1970-87 -0.9 - 0.6 
Based on unit labour costs and period average exchange rates. 
Source: As for Table 2. 
Dollar All Major 
Trading Partners 
% Change 
+ 4.2 - 1.3 
+ 0.4 + 0.7 
+ 2.2 - 0.2 
These results do not support the view that traditional Irish industry has 
experienced a significant loss in competitiveness since joining the EMS. There 
has been some real appreciation relative to other member countries but this has 
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been extremely modest. Overall the real exchange rate has remained 
remarkably stable since the establishment of the system. The results for the 
period prior to the EMS confirm a significant gain in competitiveness relative 
to the other members during that period. They also support the view that the 
apparent loss in competitiveness relative to the UK during the 1970s was more 
than offset by increases in productivity. Even allowing for the limitations in 
these calculations it would appear that losses in competitiveness as a result of 
EMS membership have not been as great as sometimes claimed. 
One obvious question that arises with respect to both sets of results concerns 
the choice of base year. This is especially true given that the results seem to cast 
doubt on the reliability of the base year chosen in other studies. The results 
were re-estimated using 1965 and an average of the real exchange rate over the 
1965-70 period as bases. (Some of the results using the latter base are given in 
Table 5.) These calculations yielded broadly similar results although they 
suggest that the real exchange rate depreciation with respect to EMS currencies 
began with the 1967 devaluation of sterling and the Irish pound. 
TABLE 5: 
1965-78 
1978-87 
1965-87 
Irish Pound Real Exchange Rate (Average 
(Average Manufacturing Earnings) 
1965-70 = 100) 
Sterling EMS · Dollar All Major 
Trading Partners 
% Change 
+ 2.5 
- 0.4 
+ 1.4 
Annual 
- 1.5 
+2.8 
+ 0.2 
+4.9 
+ 3.2 
+ 3.3 
+ 1. 7 
+ 1.3 
+ 1.5 
Source: As for Table 2. 
4. Impact of Exchange Rate Policy 
The combined results using wage inflation data, both adjusted and 
unadjusted for productivity gains, to calculate the real exchange rate, indicate 
that traditional industry experienced some loss in competitiveness relative to 
EMS countries since 1978. The data suggest that these losses represented, in 
part, a reversal of short-term gains recorded during the years leading up to the 
establishment of the EMS. However, Bacon (op. cit.) has pointed to "high 
unemployment coupled with large outflows of both labour and capital from the 
Irish economy during the 1980s as clear indications of an economy that was 
uncompetitive in some fundamental sense.'' 
The main effect of real exchange rate changes as already pointed out will be 
felt in the exposed or tradable sector. A real appreciation will lead to a decline 
in the tradable sector as export markets are lost and imports capture a growing 
share of the domestic market. In line with the approach adopted by Soderstrom 
(1985), trends in the tradable sector's share of GDP are considered in Figure 
4. Industry is used as an indicator of the tradable sector. Admittedly this has 
some drawbacks as it includes some non-traded sectors such as construction 
and excludes traded services. 
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Figure 4 Industry as % GDP 
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Source: CSO, National Income and Expenditure, Tables 3 and 30a. 
The results appear to discount the idea that exchange rate movements have 
led to a decline in the tradable sector as industry's share of GDP has risen since 
the early 1980s. However, "transfer pricing" by multinational firms is believed 
to distort the figures. In order to correct for this, profit repatriations were 
excluded from the industrial output and overall GDP figures and the ratio re-
calculated. (As profit repatriations were relatively low prior to 1977 the ratio 
has only been re-calculated for the years since then.) This gives a sightly 
different picture. On this basis industry's share of GDP has declined since 
EMS entry with a particularly sharp fall in 1984. This is not conclusive 
evidence of uncompetitiveness since the service sector has increased its share 
of output in many developed economies. 
Soderstrom ( op. cit.) has pointed out that the tradable sector in Small Open 
Economies (SO Es) has been subject to a variety of external shocks during the 
past 15 years. Higher oil prices, rapid technological change, increased 
competition from NICs all involved a squeeze on traditional manufacturing 
sectors requiring some structural adjustment within the tradable sector from 
traditional to modern tradable sectors. In Ireland's case EC membership 
reinforced the need for such a structural adjustment as it led to the removal of 
protection of many traditional manufacturing sectors. 
In order to assess the performance of the modern and traditional tradable 
sectors, trends in manufacturing employment are analysed in Table 6. 
Manufacturing employment is broken down into modern and traditional 
sectors. The same rlefinitinn is used for the modern sector as in Table 3. 
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TABLE 6: Trends in Manufacturing Employment 
1973 1979 1983 1987 
('OOO) 
Traditional Manufacturing 184.4 195.9 164.5 141.3 
Modern Manufacturing 23.2 32.0 38.5 42.4 
Total Manufacturing 207.6 228.0 202.9 183. 7 
Figures relate to September each year. 
Source: CSO; Census of Industrial Production for 1973, 1979 and 1983, Quarterly Inquiry on Industrial 
Employment for 198 7. 
The decline in manufacturing employment since 1979 is evident from the 
table. However, the figures show that the fall in employment has occurred in 
traditional sectors. Employment in these sectors increased up to 1979 in spite 
of a combination of adverse external factors during this period. Employment 
in the modern manufacturing sector has continued to increase since 1979. This 
pattern is more in keeping with Soderstrom's explanation of structural 
adjustment in the economy rather than one of real exchange rate appreciations 
squeezing the entire tradable sector. 
Soderstrom ( op. cit.) has argued that declines in traditional manufacturing 
sectors due to structural changes may be mistakenly attributed to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. He also suggested that declines in such 
sectors could pose political difficulties. In such circumstances the authorities 
may be tempted to "save" all employment in traditional industries by means 
of a real exchange rate depreciation in excess of the original cost disturbance. 
This "exchange rate protection" impedes the reallocation of resources within 
the tradable sector. As Goodhart (1987) put it in the case of the UK: 
I believe that one can raise something of a counter argument, that the bad 
effects of misalignment and de-industralisation have .been somewhat 
overstated. This would run in terms of asserting that there has been a 
predilection, in the United Kingdom, at least, for the authorities to support 
declining industries too much and too long, and a hope that, when the 
misalignment does end, there will be new technologies and new industries 
emerging which in any case would have required a shift of factors of 
production if growth and efficiency were to be maximised (p. 22). 
The period up to 1979 in Ireland was marked by a steady depreciation of the 
real exchange rate relative to EMS countries. This was due to a large nominal 
exchange rate depreciation arising as a result of the link with sterling. 
Maintenance of the sterling llink may have shielded traditional industries from 
the effects of increased competition from Europe and NICs in both home and 
export markets. 
The UK is the main export market for traditional manufacturing industries. 
Irish firms exporting to the UK must compete with imports from other 
countries (including EMS members) as well as with UK firms. Prior to EMS 
entry, both Irish and UK producers experienced a significant gain in 
competitiveness relative to their competitors in EMS countries. This has since 
been reversed and it is worth noting that EMS countries ( excluding Ireland) 
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have increased their share of UK imports from 36.6 per cent in 1978 to 44.9 
per cent in 1987 while overall import penetration of the UK market was rising 
(UK CSO). 
Horne (1981) has argued that the decision to devalue in line with sterling in 
1967 marks the beginnings of a "defensive" exchange rate strategy by the Irish 
authorities. EMS entry therefore represented an abandonment of such a 
strategy. The change in exchange rate target occurred at the same time as the 
second "oil-price shock" required some further structural adjustments. The 
decline in traditional sectors since 1979 ought therefore to be attributed, at least 
in part, to the structural adjustments necessitated by changes in the external 
environment rather than to the exchange rate policy pursued. 
There were also domestic factors at work contributing to the fall in 
employment. Domestic demand contracted sharply during the early 1980s due 
to the restrictive fiscal stance adopted by the Irish authorities. This 
undoubtedly had an effect on industries producing for the home market. The 
Department of Industry and Commerce (1986) reported that "about one third 
of the loss of ouput by domestic manufacturers in 1980-85 was due to a fall in 
domestic demand". 
In addition fiscal policy may have contributed to any loss in competitiveness 
that occurred. It is widely believed that a growing "tax-wedge" pushed up both 
earnings and labour costs during the early 1980s. (See Bradley (1988)). Thus 
fiscal policy was a factor in any loss of competitiveness that occurred since EMS 
entry. Fiscal policy also affected competitiveness in other ways as high levels of 
Government borrowing were reflected in high interest rates although this is 
beyond the scope of the current paper. 
Dornbusch (1987) pointed out how a sustained overvaluation of the exchange 
rate could cause industry to locate outside the home country. In Ireland's case 
the depreciation in the real exchange rate especially vis-a-vis EMS countries 
during the 1970s may have attracted firms relocating in this fashion and played 
a part in attracting overseas industry to Ireland. The real exchange rate 
appreciation since EMS membership may have reduced Ireland's attractiveness 
as a location for investment by overseas firms in recent years at the same time 
as traditional sources of overseas investment were drying up. Consequently the 
expansion of the modern sector may have been adversely affected at the same 
time as the protection afforded to traditional sectors by exchange rate policy 
was being eliminated. 
5. Implications for Policy 
Evidence of a real exchange rate appreciation since 1979 has been advanced 
as an explanation of the decline in manufacturing employment. The optimal 
policy response to such a situation would be to restore the real exchange rate 
to its equilibrium level. Consequently evidence of losses in competitiveness 
have been advanced on occasion in support of calls for a devaluation of the Irish 
pound. 
The evidence presented here is that focusing solely on the period since EMS 
entry may overstate the extent of losses in competitiveness experienced by Irish 
industry. It is also suggested that the decline of traditional manufacturing 
sectors reflects a variety of other factors. These include structural adjustments 
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necessitated by external shocks which may have been either postponed by a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate during the 1970s or simply have taken 
time to impact on employment. The fact that industries such as clothing and 
textiles which experienced falls in employment in Ireland were also declining 
in other European countries tends to support the structural adjustment 
argument. Such structural adjustments may have been mistakenly attributed 
to losses in competitiveness. In addition, a restrictive fiscal stance embodying 
a sharp increase in taxation also appears to have played a role in the fall in 
employment in traditional manufacturing sectors. 
"The exchange. rate mechanism should facilitate adjustment to external 
shocks by giving appropriate price signals to domestic agents" (Spencer (1986) 
p. 138). Prior to EMS membership Irish exchange rate policy appears to have 
failed in this respect and actually hindered such adjustment. It would appear 
that any devaluation of the Irish pounc;l would not be justified but would instead 
represent a return to a "defensive exchange rate strategy". This would still be 
true even if sterling were to depreciate significantly from its present level. 
Despite the evidence presented thus far the fact remains that manufacturing 
employment has fallen sharply over the past 7 years and there is little sign of 
anything other than a modest recovery. At the same time output in the modern 
manufacturing sectors appears to be booming even if the value figures are 
artificially boosted by "transfer pricing". (See O'Leary (1984) for a detailed 
discussion of the distortionary effects of "transfer pricing" on recorded output 
growth.) Even in traditional sectors the shake-out has taken place mainly on the 
employment side while productivity has grown substantially. Such 
developments may indicate an economy where labour has suffered a loss in 
competitiveness relative to capital rather than one which has suffered a 
significant loss in competitiveness relative to overseas rivals. Such a view is 
supported by a number of considerations. The sharp rise in income and payroll 
taxes during the early 1980s resulted in a situation in which according to the 
OECD (1987 p. 48) "no other OECD country had a tax system as biased 
against the use of· labour as the Irish". Consequently it may be more 
appropriate to focus attention on improving this aspect of competitiveness 
rather than the exchange rate. 
6. Conclusion 
Losses in competitiveness arising from increases in relative labour costs and 
adherence to a hard currency policy have been advanced by some 
commentators as a major factor in the decline in manufacturing employment 
in Ireland during the 1980s. The present paper examined trends in labour cost 
competitiveness over the entire period since 1970. The evidence revealed some 
loss of competitiveness relative to EMS currencies since the establishment of 
the system but this represented a reversal of gains during the period hefore its 
establishment. When allowance was made for gains in productivity the loss of 
competitiveness proved to be relatively modest. 
The paper argued that the role of losses in competitiveness in explaining 
manufacturing job losses since 1980 may have been overstated. It identified a 
number of other factors which had adverse effects on manufacturing 
employment. These included higher energy prices, technology changes and 
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increased competition from NICs and the EC. It is suggested that the decline 
in the real exchange rate relative to EMS currencies prior to 1979 may have 
hindered the adjustment process by shielding traditional industries from the 
full effects of these shocks. In addition, it was argued that domestic fiscal policy 
has had an adverse effect on employment in traditional industries since EMS 
entry. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of a devaluation as 
a means of boosting industry's performance. 
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